The year of 2013 marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of Michel Treisman's classic 1963 paper (Treisman, 1963) . By positing an 'internal clock' based on a pacemaker, counter, store, and comparator this paper provided a foundation for the study of timing, which led to the subsequent development and expression of scalar timing theory as an information-processing model (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984) . Timing & Time Perception celebrates this anniversary by devoting this issue to the 'internal clock' with an article by Treisman as its centrepiece. Treisman's contribution for this issue discusses the genesis of his 1963 article, and the original publication speaks clearly for itself, so I will not discuss these directly, but only briefly mention three aspects of this work, two of which can only really be appreciated in retrospect.
The first aspect is its originality. We are now so accustomed to clock-based accounts of human and animal timing (but see Simen et al., 2013 , in this issue) that we might imagine that they were always present in the literature -going back to the 19th century when time perception was a relatively more popular topic than it is now (see Lejeune & Wearden, 2009 , for discussion) -but this is not so. Searching for clock models before Treisman (1963) yields virtually nothing, if by 'clock models' we mean anything resembling the detailed quantitative theorizing found in Treisman's paper. Although the research of Hoagland (1933) is acknowledged by Treisman (1963 Treisman ( , 2013 in this issue) as an influence on his work, in fact Hoagland made no attempt whatsoever to construct a psychological model of timing, still less a quantitatively developed one, as his main preoccupation was to discover the physical basis of his postulated 'chemical clock ' (see Bell, 1966 , for discussion).
Of pre-Treisman research, only Creelman (1962) comes anywhere close to his theoretical advances, in proposing a clock-counter model to simulate data from experiments on the discrimination of short auditory durations. Creelman's model, as well as suggesting a clock-like 'pulse counting' device, also incorporates memory mechanisms, although the memory and decision aspects of his model are much less developed than in Treisman: to follow Treisman (2013), we might say that Creelman proposed the basic clock, but omitted much of the 'clockwork needed to instantiate the clock into a viable psychological model.
A second aspect of Treisman (1963) is its prescience, in that it introduces issues that were only to be followed up (both by Treisman himself and others) many years later. The idea of an arousal-sensitive pacemaker was, as Treisman (2013) points out, only more fully explored from the 1990s onwards (e.g., Penton-Voak et al., 1996; Treisman et al., 1990) , through the initial discovery that repetitive stimulation in the form of clicks or flashes seemed to 'speed up' pacemaker rate. Interest in effects of repetitive stimulation on both temporal and non-temporal psychological processes seems to be growing year by year (Jones, Alleley, & Wearden, 2011) , and effects of exercise, emotion, drugs, and other manipulations on judgments of duration have also been explained in terms of arousal (e.g., Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; Lambourne, 2012) . Another issue discussed in Treisman, but only recently investigated, is potential changes in temporal judgments during experimental sessions, which may result from decreases in arousal (see Wearden, 2008) .
Last, but not least, I offer some documentary evidence to support Treisman's (2013) contention that (surprisingly to modern readers) his 1963 paper attracted little interest after publication. Figure 1 shows Web of Knowledge citations of the article in 5-year blocks (the most recent period is incomplete, but trends are clear). The picture tells its own story: nearly 25 years passed before this classic work received the interest that it now so clearly deserves. In these days of clamour for 
